Democratic Resilience

Can the United States Withstand Rising Polarization?

Edited by

ROBERT C. LIEBERMAN
Johns Hopkins University

SUZANNE METTLER
Cornell University

KENNETH M. ROBERTS
Cornell University

CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom

One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA

477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia

314–321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre, New Delhi – 110025, India

103 Penang Road, #05–06/07, Visioncrest Commercial, Singapore 238467

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

It furthers the University's mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781108834100
DOI: 10.1017/9781108999601

First published 2022

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
NAMES: Lieberman, Robert C., 1964– editor. | Mettler, Suzanne, editor. | Roberts, Kenneth M., 1958– editor.
TITLE: Democratic resilience : can the United States withstand rising polarization? / Edited by Robert C. Lieberman, Johns Hopkins University, Suzanne Mettler, Cornell University, New York, Kenneth M. Roberts, Cornell University, New York.
DESCRIPTION: Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2022. | Includes index.
IDENTIFIERS: LCCN 2021017219 (print) | LCCN 2021017220 (ebook) | ISBN 9781108834100 (hardback) | ISBN 9781108999601 (ebook)
SUBJECTS: LCSH: Democracy – United States – History. | Polarization (Social sciences) – United States. | Political culture – United States – History. | United States – Politics and government. | BISAC: POLITICAL SCIENCE / American Government / General
CLASSIFICATION: LCC JK1726 .D457 2022 (print) | LCC JK1726 (ebook) | DDC 306.20973–dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021017219
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021017220

ISBN 978-1-108-83410-0 Hardback
ISBN 978-1-108-99564-1 Paperback

8

The Great White Hope

Threat and Racial Resilience in the Age of Trump

Christopher Sebastian Parker and Matt A. Barreto

INTRODUCTION

Political polarization, according to the influential text, *How Democracies Die* (HDD), is at the root of the decline of American democracy.[1] In fact, we are more polarized now, as Trump exits the Oval Office, than the country's been in the last seventy-five years.[2] Still, the current round of polarization began in earnest on Obama's watch. Together, Trump and Obama own four of the top five years on record as the most polarizing since 1945. Given the evidence that race has driven partisanship more now than any other time in recent history, it seems to us that racism goes a long way toward explaining the acceleration of polarization in recent years.[3] Even when it comes to the celebrated affective approach to polarization,[4] recent research illustrates that race, more than any other factor, best explains interparty antipathy.[5]

[1] Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, *How Democracies Die* (New York: Crown, 2018).

[2] https://news.gallup.com/poll/283910/trump-third-year-sets-new-standard-party-polarization.aspx

[3] Marisa Abrajano and Zoltan L. Hajnal, *White Backlash: Immigration, Race, and American Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015); Michael Tesler, *Post Racial or Most Racial: Race and Politics in the Obama Era* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016).

[4] See, for example, Shanto Iyengar, and Sean J. Westwood, "Fear and Loathing Across Party Lines: New Evidence on Group Polarization," *American Journal of Political Science* 59, no. 3 (2012): 690–707. For a slightly different approach, one that emphasizes social polarization, see Lilliana Mason, *Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018).

[5] Nicholas A. Valentino and Kirill Zhirkov, "Blue Is Black and Red Is White? Affective Polarization in the Racialized Schemas of US Party Coalitions," Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, 2018.

Beginning with his candidacy, the most important factor predicting support for Trump is race,[6] a pattern that carried over into the general election of 2016.[7] Missing from these accounts for why Trump won, however, is *why* race is such a key factor. Following others, we argue that underlying the import of race in predicting Trump's success is the anxiety and anger, on the part of many whites, with the increasing diversity taking place in America.[8] This is in keeping with work that shows how whites, when primed with the fact that the United States will be a majority-minority country in 2042, tend to adopt more conservative positions.[9] Trump supporters, in other words, are unsettled at the prospect of losing "their" country. Thus, the ubiquitous refrain, "Make America Great Again," we believe, refers to a time during which WASP cultural dominance remained unchallenged. In short, he won, at least *in part*, because those who supported him believed that the country was changing too fast, a sentiment made popular most recently by the Tea Party movement.[10] (Make no mistake, the Tea Party paved the way for Trump's presidency.[11])

Most accounts of resistance to the Trump presidency identify the #Resistance and the Women's March, both in January 2017, as the beginning of the resistance. We argue, however, that people of color (POC) began to resist before 2017. For POC, Trump represents a reversion to a dated sense of

[6] John Sides, Michael Tesler, and Lynn Vavreck, *Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018).

[7] Jon Green and Sean McElwee, "The Differential Effects of Economic Conditions and Racial Attitudes in the Election of Donald Trump," *Perspectives on Politics* 17, no. 2 (2019): 358–79.

[8] Brenda Major, Alison Blodorn, and Gregory Major Blascovich, "The Threat of Increasing Diversity: Why Many White Americans Support Trump in the 2016 Presidential Election," *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations* 21, no. 6 (2018): 1–10.

[9] Maureen Craig and Jennifer Richeson, "On the Precipice of a 'Majority-Minority' America: Perceived Status Threat from the Racial Demographic Shift Affects White Americans' Political Ideology," *Psychological Science* 25, no. 6 (2014): 1189–97.

[10] Kevin Arceneaux and Stephen P. Nicholson, "Who Wants to Have a Tea Party? The Who, What, and Why of the Tea Party Movement," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 45, no. 4 (2012): 700–10; Matt Barreto, Betsy L. Cooper, Benjamin Gonzalez, Christopher S. Parker, and Christopher Towler, "The Tea Party in the Age of Obama: Mainstream Conservatism or Out-Group Anxiety?" *Political Power and Social Theory* 22, no. 1 (2012): 105–37; Christopher S. Parker and Matt A. Barreto, *Change They Can't Believe In: The Tea Party and Reactionary Politics in America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013).

[11] Bryan T. Gervais and Irwin L. Morris, *Reactionary Republicanism: How the Tea Party in the House Paved the Way for Trump's Victory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); see also Rachel M. Blum, *How the Tea Party Captured the GOP: Insurgent Factions in American Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2020).

American national identity, one featuring an ethnocultural understanding of the nation from which they (POC) were excluded. Given what Trump has explicitly said about Mexicans and Muslims, and lecturing "the Blacks," it comes as no great shock that many POC felt threatened by him and by his supporters who displayed xenophobic or racist signs at his campaign rallies. The anxiety and anger associated with the prospect of turning the racial clock back to the 1960s compelled POC to resist, and we can detect resistance to Trump and his supporters in the data during the 2016 election.

In this chapter, we advance theories of threat that are present for whites and POC during Trump's first campaign. We argue that the sentiments expressed by the former are ultimately driven by status threat – the perception that one's way of life is under threat. In other words, the threat is wholly of a symbolic nature; it's not material. In the present context, Trump's supporters are threatened by the loss of "their" country: whites' cultural hegemony. On the flip side, we argue that racial and ethnic minorities saw the emergent Trump movement as a threat to racial progress, mobilizing in response.

We test these propositions by examining the political attitudes and behavior of whites and POC in the 2016 campaign cycle using the American National Election Survey (ANES) and the Comparative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS). Ultimately, we find support for our theory of existential threat motivating whites who supported Trump and POC who opposed him. Further, for both groups who responded to the existential threat, we find they were significantly more likely to engage in politics in 2016 than their counterparts who were less convinced of such an existential threat to their group's status.

In the end, this chapter suggests that even as Trump damaged American democracy, his bigotry may, ironically, sow the seeds of its (democracy's) renewal. As it turns out, this is precisely what happened after 2016 when communities of color, led by the Black community, pushed Democrats to victory at the national and subnational level.[12] Findings from this chapter are also indicative of the role race plays in the polarization of American politics. In light of our results, it's beyond shocking that race and racism are almost never included when scholars discuss polarization. This chapter makes plain why such an "oversight" is, at best, unwise, for as the

[12] For subnational outcome, see https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/403977-theres-a-boost-in-black-turnout-especially-among-black-women-voters; for the national level, see https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-race-and-ethnicity-virus-outbreak-georgia-7a843bbce00713cfde6c3fdbc2e31eb7.

outcome 2020 election makes clear, American democracy's resilience was a nonstarter absent the turnout of POC.[13]

This chapter unfolds as follows. First, we furnish the reader with a bit of background on the Trump movement. This is followed by an overview of the origins of resistance on the part of POC. Next, we outline how theories of threat apply to both groups. Briefly, Trump's support is fueled by perceived threats to the WASP way of life, while Trump and supporters are believed to pose a threat to racial progress on the part of POC. The ensuing data analysis first assesses the determinants of Trump support or, in the case of POC, rejection. The second stage of the analysis entails an illustration of how Trump motivates political engagement among his supporters as well as POC. Here, the argument shifts to what Trump represents. For his supporters, he represents a means for them to preserve their way of life. For POC, he represents a threat to racial progress. We end with a brief discussion of how the results fit within a broader framework on the fragility of American democracy in Trump's America.

BACKGROUND AND THEORY: THREAT IN THE AGE OF TRUMP

We argue that the perception of cultural threat, on the part of many whites, drives support for Trump. Similar to the way in which the Tea Party movement represented a reaction to threat stimulated by social change and the election of a Black President, we argue that Trump serves a similar purpose (i.e., as a vessel for reactionary sentiment). In fact, much of what we have to say about Trump supporters references existing work on the Tea Party.[14] After all, the demographic composition of the former and latter are quite similar. According to exit polls, Trump voters were more likely to be male, older, white, strong conservatives, relatively well-off economically, and Christian.[15] This is the same demographic that supported the Tea Party movement. Notwithstanding the time period during which each appeared, we argue that little, if any, daylight separates Trump supporters from its forebears: the Know Nothing Party, the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) of the 1920s, the John Birch Society (JBS), and the Tea Party. Without exception, these groups felt threatened by the social

[13] www.brookings.edu/blog/how-we-rise/2020/11/24/how-black-americans-saved-biden-and-american-democracy/

[14] Arceneaux and Nicholson, "Who Wants to Have a Tea Party?"; Parker and Barreto, *Change They Can't Believe In*; Theda Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson, *The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

[15] www.cnn.com/election/results/exit-polls.

change happening around them: they were losing "their" country.[16] These effects aren't confined to the American context. Indeed, scholars now point to a consistent finding in America *and* Europe: that cultural, not economic, concerns about immigration are driving these reactionary movements.[17]

Then, as now, a skeptic might offer an alternative hypothesis, such as economic anxiety. Then, as now, we believe it doesn't square with reality: in each of the historic examples we offered, economic anxiety was not a motive for supporting these reactionary movements. Extensive research finds that Tea Party supporters were fueled more by cultural anxiety than concerns over government spending.[18] Likewise, extant research reveals that anti-Obama sentiment among conservatives was mostly explained by racial attitudes, not the price tag of his health care bill.[19] While Trump movement supporters may well have been anxious, it was not about their economic condition, but about their declining status in a changing America.[20] Even when movement supporters explicitly stated economic concerns, a deeper look suggests this was nothing more than a proxy for their cultural anxiety amid changing demographics.[21]

[16] Right-wing movements generally emerge to preserve the status, interests, or cultural preferences of dominant groups. Theoretically, this is called the "status politics" model, ultimately made famous by Gusfield, in which an attempt is made to either preserve or restore the power and privilege, or cultural preference of a dominant social group thought to be in decline or completely without influence. Political action, moreover, was seen as an attempt to project their anxiety onto public objects. Bell, Hofstadter and Lipset were the most visible supporters of this approach, which rose to prominence from the late 1950s through the mid-1960s. See Daniel Bell, "The Dispossessed," in *The Radical Right*, ed. Daniel Bell (New York: Doubleday, 1963), 1–46; Joseph R. Gusfield, *Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American Temperance Movement* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1963); Richard Hofstadter, *The Paranoid Style in American Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965); Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, *The Politics of Unreason: Right-Wing Extremism in American Politics, 1790–1977* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970).

[17] See for instance, Jens Hainmueller and Daniel Hopkins, "Public Attitudes Toward Immigration," *Annual Review of Political Science* 17 (2014): 225–49; see also Ronald F. Inglehart and Pippa Norris, "Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Haves and Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash," Faculty Research Working Paper Series, August 2016.

[18] Parker and Barreto, *Change They Can't Believe In.*

[19] Michael Tesler. 2012. "The Spillover of Racialization into Health Care: How President Obama Polarized Public Opinion by Racial Attitudes and Race," *American Journal of Political Science* 56, no. 3 (July 2012): 690–704.

[20] Diana Mutz, "Status Threat, Not Economic Hardship, Explains the 2016 Presidential Vote," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Science* 115, no. 19 (2018): E4330–39; Green and McElwee, "Differential Effects"; and Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck, *Identity Crisis.*

[21] Others arrive at a similar conclusion, in a different context, in which perceived symbolic threat pushed those in the cultural majority to adopt less tolerant positions far more than

If the economic angst of working-class whites cannot account for emergence of reactionary movements, what can?[22] Historically, partisanship generally informs whether or not one identifies with reactionary movements.[23] But partisanship isn't the only factor: racism is another. Indeed, from the KKK to the Tea Party, both are consistently associated with support for reactionary movements.[24] Building on the Tea Party, Trump ratcheted racial anxiety up another notch. Trump's statements about "Mexicans" and "Muslims," and references to "the Blacks," are clear indicators that racism is part of his appeal. Recent work on support for Trump validates this intuition.[25] Other work indicates that the need for social conformity (authoritarianism) is also associated with support for Trump.[26]

Still, racism and authoritarianism represent marked departures from what we believe is the *principal factor* that explains support for reactionary movements from the past to the present: status threat. We argue that reactionary movements are driven, at least in part, by a desire for the group to regain social prestige by returning to the past. From a substantive perspective, this impulse is associated with all of the reactionary movements we've noted. We cannot say the same for racism. After all, a good portion of the Know Nothing Party in the mid-nineteenth century weren't as concerned about Blacks as they were about Irish immigrants – particularly Catholics.[27] Nor can we say the same for authoritarianism, for it failed to inform the extent to which one identified with the Tea Party.

more material concerns, such as one's economic circumstance. See Paul M. Sniderman, Louk Hagendorn, and Markus Prior, "Predisposing Factors and Situational Triggers: Exclusionary Reactions to Immigrant Minorities," *American Political Science Review* 98, no.1 (2014): 35–39.

[22] More recent work arrives at the same conclusion vis-à-vis Trump supporters: www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/05/its-time-to-bust-the-myth-most-trump-voters-were-not-working-class/?utm_term=.d8545c628400.

[23] Alan Abramowitz and Kyle Saunders, "Ideological Realignment in the U.S. Electorate," *Journal of Politics* 60, no. 3 (1998): 634–52.

[24] Rory McVeigh and Kevin Estep, *The Politics of Losing: Trump, the Klan, and the Mainstreaming of Resentment* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019); Parker and Barreto, *Change They Can't Believe In.*

[25] Thomas Wood, "Racism Motivated Trump Voters More than Authoritarianism," Monkey Cage, *Washington Post,* April 17, 2017; Jonathan Capehart, "The Real Reason Working-Class Whites Continue to Support Trump," Post Partisan, *Washington Post,* June 6, 2017.

[26] Matthew C. MacWilliams, "Who Decides When the Party Doesn't? Authoritarian Voters and the Rise of Donald Trump," *PS Political Science & Politics* 49, no. 4 (2016): 716–21.

[27] Tyler Anbinder, *Nativism and Slavery: The Northern Know Nothings and the Politics of the 1850s* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); Bruce Levine, "Conservatism,

Again, like the Tea Party, we picture Trump as a vessel for a certain kind of conservatism, one that fails to mesh well with the more conventional account. As we have outlined elsewhere, perhaps the most dramatic difference between establishment conservatives and what we have called "reactionary conservatives" involves the way in which the rival camps envisage the future, particularly change. Consider the following. Some of the most noted conservative intellectuals of the twentieth century felt that true conservatives must be willing to abide social and economic changes that have proven effective at furthering the American way of life, and in which most Americans are invested. Further, they also held fast to the belief that true conservatives should steadfastly refuse to entertain efforts by some that unravel the bonds of social unity.[28]

Work on the Tea Party confirmed this division between true (or, establishment conservatives) and reactionary conservatives (i.e., Tea Party conservatives, or "true believers"): the former adopted a more measured approach to President Obama and POC, where the latter believed that the president and POC were "destroying the country,"[29] and responsible for the decline of America. Given the bluster of Trump and his campaign, can we really say he and his acolytes can tolerate change, and work to consolidate the bonds that putatively characterize American society?

Another area in which our account of race and politics in the age of Trump improves upon existing scholarship to date, is through the incorporation of POC into the narrative. Indeed, beyond how many white Americans reacted to Trump, there is little doubt that through his rhetoric, campaign promises, and policy prescriptions, Trump was poised to have a significant impact on racial and ethnic minorities in the United States. After decades of fighting for first-class citizenship, it's likely that Trump's presidency threatened to undermine the progress made toward that end. In other words, Trump's presidency represented the latest round of racial retrenchment. By this, we mean a historical pattern by which some racial progress is followed by a backlash of some kind.[30] This pattern is most

Nativism, and Slavery: Thomas R. Whitney and the Origins of the Know-Nothing Party," *Journal of American History* 88, no. 2 (2001): 455–88.

[28] Here, among others, we refer to Clinton Rossiter, *Conservatism in America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982); and Russell Kirk, *The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Eliot* (Washington: Regnery, 2001).

[29] Parker and Barreto, *Change They Can't Believe In,* chap. 1.

[30] Useful examples of the this can be found in the following: Mario T. Garcia, *Mexican Americans: Leadership, Ideology, and Identity, 1930–1960* (New Haven: Yale University

easily identified when it comes to the Black community if, for no other reason, than that it has happened with more frequency for them than other POC. This dynamic follows a distinct pattern. Progress, for the Black community seems to coincide most frequently with American participation in major wars, but attempts at racial retrenchment are never far behind.[31]

For other POC, those associated with the *voluntary* immigrant experience, the swings between progress and attempts at retrenchment are less frequent, but no less jarring. Perhaps the first contemporary example of the dynamic to which we refer is most readily traceable to mobilization during the Chicano rights movements of the late 1960s, something originating in school-based protest over racist policies.[32]

More recently, California was the epicenter of reactionary politics in the mid-1990s with Republican Governor Pete Wilson and Proposition 187 in 1994. The Wilson/187 campaign was motivated by concern, on the part of many white Californians, that Latinos threatened WASP culture,[33] among other things. The ballot initiative called for withholding education and non-emergency healthcare for the undocumented. What's more, civil servants (school administrators, law enforcement, etc.) were to be charged with reporting suspected "illegal aliens" to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Needless to say, for many Latinos across California, Wilson's victory and the adoption of Prop 187 represented a threat to their rightful place in California. Latinos reacted to this threat through increased naturalization, voter registration, and voter turnout in subsequent California elections.[34] The Wilson/187 era is perhaps the best documented, but more recent examples are available. These include Latino mobilization against H.R. 4437 and the 2006 immigrant rights

Press, 1989); Phillip Klinkner and Rogers M. Smith, *The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial Equality in America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Ronald Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1998).

[31] See for example, Klinkner and Smith, *Unsteady March*; and Christopher S. Parker, *Fighting for Democracy: Black Veterans and the Struggle Against White Supremacy in the Postwar South* (Princeton: Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).

[32] Carlos Muñoz Jr., *Youth, Identity, Power: The Chicano Movement* (London: Verso, 2007).

[33] Otto Santa Ana, *Brown Tide Rising: Metaphors of Latinos in Contemporary American Discourse* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002).

[34] Matt Barreto, Ricardo Ramirez, Nathan Woods, "Are Naturalized Voters Driving the California Latino Electorate?" *Social Science Quarterly* 86, no. 4 (December 2005): 792–811; Adrian Pantoja, Ricardo Ramirez and Gary Segura, "Citizens by Choice, Voters by Necessity." *Political Research Quarterly* 54, no. 4 (December 2001): 729–50.

marches, and protest movements against Arizona's SB1070 profiling law in 2010.[35]

Notwithstanding the brevity of the Black and Latino examples here, it's easy for one to detect distinct patterns. First, challenges to the racial status quo are always met with resistance of some kind on the part of some whites. To be sure, it's not always the same resistance. During critical phases of the civil rights movement, threats to white supremacy were met with violence; for Latinos, whites reacted at the ballot box. Second, the threats that are perceived, on the part of Blacks and Latinos, are both symbolic and material. For the Black community, the idea that some might think they're not as "American" as they think they are[36] is something with which they take issue. Needless to say, Trump supporters cling to the idea that American identity is a white identity. Likewise, social standing is also important to most members of the Latino community, especially when it comes to citizenship (or, lack thereof) and the threat of deportation.[37] These issues are deeply symbolic for both communities. Further, it hardly bears mentioning that the racism harbored by Trump and his supporters has material implications to the extent that racism, in general, is typically tied to discrimination. It stands to reason, therefore, that POC will resist efforts on the part of whites to reel in whatever advances POC have achieved. In short, the present moment isn't the first time we've observed this pattern of progress followed by retrenchment followed by a reaction on the part of POC.[38]

For many non-whites, Trump merely represents the latest attempt at racial retrenchment. Still, we wish to be clear here: the type of thereat to which we refer represents a marked difference from that which motivates Trump supporters. The existential threat to Trump supporters turns on their belief that their way of life – their *culture* – is under threat, and

[35] Sophia Wallace, Chris Zepeda-Millán, and Michael Jones-Correa, "Spatial and Temporal Proximity: Examining the Effects of Protests on Political Attitudes." *The American Journal of Political Science* 58, no. 2 (2013): 433–48; Chris Zepeda-Millán. 2014. "Weapons of the (Not So) Weak: Immigrant Mass Mobilization in the US South." *Critical Sociology* 42, no. 2 (2014): 269–87.

[36] Efren O. Perez and Entung Kuo, "Racial Order, Racialized Responses: Inter-minority Politics in a Diverse Nation," *Harvard Working Group in Psychology and Political Behavior*, October 9, 2020, Harvard University.

[37] Cecilia Menjivar and Sarah M. Lahkani, "Transformative Effects of Immigration Law: Immigrants' Personal and Social Metamorphoses through Regularization," *American Journal of Sociology* 121, no. 6 (2016): 1818–55.

[38] See for example, Klinkner and Smith, *Unsteady March;* see also Desmond S. King and Rogers M. Smith, *Still a House Divided: Race and Politics in Obama's America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).

support for Trump represents their reaction.[39] This is NOT the same as the threat perceived by POC. For them, the election of Trump and his presidency represents *material* and *symbolic* threat, something that suggests that group conflict is the more appropriate model by which to assess the way(s) in which POC ultimately responded to Trump's presidency.

Group conflict involves intergroup competition over scarce resources, ones that confer relative privilege to the advantaged group. The zero-sum nature of competition over such resources is generally responsible for the perception of threat. These resources are typically embedded within the various social, economic, and political institutions of society.[40] Generally material, intergroup competition may also extend beyond, to say, schools, votes, jobs. Winners of this competition (i.e., "dominants") seek to perpetuate their dominance by generating beliefs and values that "justify" the maintenance of their advantage vis-à-vis "subordinate" groups.[41] While this may be the case for those in the cultural majority, subordinate groups are generally more concerned with material ends given the impact of discrimination. As such, consistent with the group competition model in which "outgroups . . . desire a greater share of [the] rights, resources and privileges that are 'understood' to 'belong' to the ingroup,"[42] POC seek to resist Trump and what he represents: a threat to their standing as first-class citizens.

On the other hand, it's quite possible that not all POC see Trump as a threat; indeed, some minorities are able to rationalize their position as second-class citizens.[43] However, our theory suggests that many did (view Trump as a threat), and that his occupation of the Oval Office

[39] For "Trump-specific" reactions, see Major, Blodorn, and Blascovich, "Threat of Increasing Diversity." For a more general articulation, one that anticipates Trump – especially where it concerns whites' concerns about their shrinking population relative to other racial groups – see Craig and Richeson, "On the Precipice of a 'Majority-Minority' America."

[40] See, for example, Lawrence Bobo, "Whites' Opposition to Busing: Symbolic Racism or Realistic Group Conflict?," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 45, no. 6 (1983): 1196–210; Lawrence Bobo and Vincent L. Hutchings, "Perceptions of Racial Group Competition: Extending Blumer's Theory of Group Competition to a Multiracial Context," *American Sociological Review* 61, no. 6 (December 1996): 951–72.

[41] Jim Sidanius and Felicia Pratto, *Social Dominance Theory: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

[42] Bobo and Hutchings, "Perceptions of Racial Group Competition," 955.

[43] Sidanius and Pratto, Social Dominance Theory. See also, John T. Jost, Mahzarin R. Banaji, and Brian A. Nosek, "A Decade of System Justification Theory: Accumulated Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo," *Political Psychology* 25, no. 6 (2004): 881–919.

should be especially threatening for minorities who said they strongly oppose Mr. Trump. Of course, this is in comparison to other POC who may not have supported him, or even liked him, but failed to see him as a threat. In the end, we think it likely that *many* Blacks, Latinos, and Asians perceive Trump as a threat, and that beyond their levels of identification with Democrats, or liberal ideology, it was their sense of perceived racism and discrimination that drove POC to oppose Trump. Further, we believe that strong anti-Trump attitudes spur minorities to heightened levels of political engagement, whether that's voting, protesting, or something in-between.

It's beyond question that Trump is a source of racial polarization, where most whites have a much higher regard for Trump relative to POC.[44] Even so, both sides of the racial divide agree on at least one thing: Trump is associated with threat. For Trump supporters it's about symbolic threat: their way of life – their culture – is under siege. In this sense, he represents a *reaction* to this threat. This is the classic status politics model. For POC, and commensurate with group conflict theory, the threat is rooted in material *and* symbolic concerns.[45] In this case, Trump is a proxy for racial retrenchment: HE IS the threat. For this reason, we think the group conflict/group competition model most appropriate. Based on these theoretical expectations we lay out the following four hypotheses:

H1: Whites with a high degree of existential threat are more likely to strongly support Trump

[44] www.gallup.com/poll/205832/race-education-gender-key-factors-trump-job-approval.aspx.

[45] Now, a critic may claim that "rights, resources, and privilege" transcend more material interests, that these are more symbolic objectives than material. This is a legitimate concern. Even so, all of the aforementioned are based, at least in part, on the accretion of resources, something that is actual, concrete, and therefore, material. Culture, on the other hand, is virtual, like schema. See William H. Sewell, Jr., "A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation," *American Journal of Sociology* 98, no. 1 (1992): 1–29. Elsewhere, Parker and Barreto (*Change They Can't Believe In*) address this by estimating the effect of reactionary conservatism (using Tea Party support as the proxy), and controlling for social dominance orientation, authoritarianism, racial resentment, and ethnocentrism. Together, these should roughly cover the four models of group conflict Bobo and Hutchings ("Perceptions of Racial Group Competition") identified: (1) self-interest, (2) prejudice, (3) stratification beliefs, and (4) group position. Still, their proxy predicted various and sundry policy preferences and political choice. Hopefully, this will allay any concerns one may have about a distinction without difference between the status politics and intergroup conflict models we believe appropriate for assessing our claims as they pertain to Trump supporters (who, for reasons mentioned in the text, are like Tea Party supporters), and POC, respectively.

H2: Minorities who perceive racism or discrimination are more likely to strongly oppose Trump

H3: Whites who strongly *support* Trump are more likely to participate in politics than other whites

H4: Minorities who strongly *oppose* Trump are more likely to participate in politics than other racial minorities

DATA AND MEASURES

To fully describe the racial dynamics associated with Trumpism requires the use of more than one source of evidence. As such, our empirical data analysis draws on two large public opinion surveys: the 2016 American National Election Study (ANES), and the 2016 Comparative Multiracial Post-Election Study (CMPS). The ANES includes a total of 4,271 completed interviews from a pre-election/post-election format. In 2016 subjects were interviewed both face-to-face and via the Internet. The overall ANES sample includes 3,022 white, non-Hispanic respondents and 1,249 minority respondents. Throughout our analyses, we rely on the post-election full sample weight (V160102) as provided by the ANES.

Leveraging the impact of Trumpism on POC, however, requires data with sufficient observations, as well as more questions that permit us to explore the range of Trumpism. For this, we turn to the CMPS. The CMPS includes a total of 10,145 interviews, collected online in a respondent self-administered format from December 3, 2016, to February 15, 2017. The survey (and invitation) was available to respondents in English, Spanish, Chinese (simplified), Chinese (traditional), Korean, and Vietnamese. The CMPS includes a total of 1,034 white, non-Hispanic respondents and 3,000 respondents *each* who identified as Black, Latino, or Asian American. The full data are weighted within each racial group to match the adult population in the 2015 Census ACS 1-year data file for age, gender, education, nativity, ancestry, and voter registration status. Data for registered voters comes from the national voter registration database email sample, and respondents were randomly selected to participate in the study, and confirmed they were registered to vote before starting the survey. For the non-registered sample, emails addresses were randomly selected from various online panel vendors.[46]

[46] For the CMPS, a total of 298,159 email addresses were selected and sent invitations to participate in the survey and 29,489 people accepted the invitation and started the survey,

We draw on these two datasets because each adds an important dimension to our overall story about the 2016 election and the Trump movement. The ANES contains virtually all of the classic questions on voter attitudes, which may explain why certain subgroups of voters supported Trump. We can account for economic anxiety, authoritarianism, racial resentment, immigrant anxiety, sexism, and much more. By almost any measure, it is the gold-standard public opinion dataset with respect to American elections. We also turn to the CMPS data, which has two principal advantages over the ANES, allowing us to tell a deep and rich story about 2016. First, the CMPS has a much larger sample of racial minorities, with over 3,000 interviews *each* among Blacks, Latinos, and Asians Americans. Second, the CMPS contains many more precise questions about the minority experience in America during the 2016 election that are not found on the ANES. Across these two public opinion surveys, we are quite confident that we can assess and explain the origins and impact of the Trump movement for both white, non-Hispanics as well as for People of Color.

Measuring Existential and Cultural Threat. We begin with the ANES and model support for Trump using the 0–100 feeling thermometer as our dependent variable. This allows us to observe variation in Trump enthusiasm that a simple Trump/Clinton vote measure would miss. To assess threat, we focus on three key independent variables in our models for whites, and three separate variables in our models for POC.

For whites we start with the Tea Party feeling thermometer. Existing work suggests that Tea Party intensity is a good proxy for reactionary sentiment commensurate with status threat.[47] Next, we include a set of questions from the ANES related to what constitutes the cultural meaning of American identity which many see as under attack today.[48] We argue

for an effective response rate of 9.9 percent. Among the 29,489 people who started the survey, 11,868 potential respondents were terminated due to quotas being full, which resulted in 17,621 who were eligible to take the survey of which 10,145 completed the full questionnaire for a cooperation rate of 57.6 percent. Respondents were given a $10 or $20 gift card as compensation for their participation. Non-registered voters were randomly selected from one of six online panels of respondents from Federated, Poder, Research Now, Netquest, SSI, and Prodege, and confirmed that they were not registered to vote before starting the survey. Programming and data collection for the full project were overseen by Pacific Market Research in Renton, Washington.

[47] Arceneaux and Nicholson, "Who Wants to Have a Tea Party?"; Corey Robin, *The Reactionary Mind: Conservatism from Edmund Burke to Sarah Palin* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Parker and Barreto, *Change They Can't Believe In*.

[48] Items V162271-V162274, POST: To be truly American important to . . .

that central to status threat is the perception of threats to American identity, and a series of four items on the ANES captures this directly. We scale four questions into a single item,[49] ranging from 0 (not important at all) to 12 (very important):

Some people say that the following things are important for being truly American. Others says they are not important. How important do you think the following is for being truly American . . .

- To have been born in the United States
- To have American ancestry
- To be able to speak English
- To follow America's customs and traditions

Finally, we include a variable that taps into a preference for tradition, something that suggests resistance to change. This is central to reactionary politics and status threat.[50] The ANES asked respondents if they agreed or disagree with the statement: "Our country would be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the authorities tell us to do, and get rid of the 'rotten apples' who are ruining everything."[51] Each of these items, collectively representing symbolic threat, we believe are positively associated with the Trump feeling thermometer, even after controlling for ideology, partisanship, and much more. Specifically, we are also controlling for racial resentment, ethnocentrism, authoritarianism, and other alternative explanations. The question here is whether or not our three unique measures of existential threat will tell their own independent story about Trump support – our theory suggests they will.

For POC, we also identify three key measures on the ANES, as well as on the CMPS. On the ANES, we use two items related to perceived group discrimination against Blacks and Latinos in the United States as a gauge of the threat the Trump movement poses to POC.[52] If we're right, then POC who perceive Blacks and Latinos under attack will be more likely to reject Trump, who represents the likelihood of more discrimination, something that taps into a more material dimension. The third measure we use for minorities is a question about POC needing to "adapt" to

[49] Each item has four answer values from (0) not at all important to (3) very important, and together they have an alpha score of 0.79.

[50] Hofstadter, *Paranoid Style*; Lipset and Raab, *Politics of Unreason*; Parker and Barreto, *Change They Can't Believe In*.

[51] Item V162169, POST: Country would be great by getting rid of rotten apples.

[52] Items V162357 (Discrimination against Blacks) and V162358 (Discrimination against Hispanics).

America's culture, an item we use as a means of representing more symbolic concerns. The ANES asked, "Now thinking about minorities in the United States. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 'Minorities should adapt to the customs and traditions of the United States.'"[53] Again, we think POC who feel as though minorities should be able to exist as Americans without having to change their culture, would feel threatened by Trump and hence more likely to reject him. Again, we put emphasis on these three items independent of classic controls for ideology, partisanship, and racial attitudes.

In the CMPS data, we are able to pick up many of these same themes, as well as some that are more faithful to our theory in terms of face validity. In addition, the CMPS allows us to estimate composite models for POC, as we did with the ANES, but it also permits us to estimate models by race. We take full advantage of this. Using the CMPS, we include measures for whether respondents mentioned racism as one of the most important problems confronting the nation. We also include a measure for whether respondents have personally experienced discrimination in the past twelve months. Finally, we include a measure that taps into the cultural threat that many POC may have felt as a result of the Trump movement which we term *POC are not valued*. The CMPS also included a question that gets at symbolic threat: "Most Americans value and respect your individual presence in the United States." We expect minorities who think other Americans *do not* value or respect their presence in the United States are likely to reject Trump, relative to those who believe in the desirability of assimilation.

RESULTS

In what follows, we test the aforementioned hypotheses. Foreshadowing our findings, we begin with our first two hypotheses, the ones that assess how symbolic and material threat inform perceptions of Trump. Across both datasets, our regression models predicting support for Trump confirm our theory of threat, for both whites and people of color. In models for whites, proxies for symbolic threat are associated with high levels of Trump support. When examining POC, our measures of material and symbolic threat are statistically associated with opposition to Trump. What's more, our results hold up when including many competing explanations and ruling out alternative theories that have been proposed.

[53] Item V162266, POST: Minorities should adapt to the customs/traditions of US.

Likewise, our models confirm our second set of hypotheses vis-à-vis Trump as a proxy for status threat and group conflict for whites and POC, respectively. For whites, status threat pushes them toward political engagement, similar to the way in which group conflict encourages political mobilization on the part of POC.

Feelings Toward Trump

Our first set of models considers both white and POC degree of Trump support using the ANES 2016 dataset. Isolating the impact of the variables we use to highlight threat requires us to account for a number of possible confounds, ones generally associated with support for Trump: moral traditionalism, racial resentment, social dominance order, authoritarianism, ethnocentrism, and sexism. Beyond that, we include the expected controls for partisanship, ideology, size of government, economic anxiety, and demographic controls. Covariates in place, we can now turn to our three proxy variables for existential threat (i.e., threats to their way of life), for whites.

As Figure 8.1 illustrates, all three of the items that tap into symbolic threat are associated with increased support for Trump. The Tea Party thermometer – which prior research suggests reflects a reactionary disposition – is positively associated with Trump support.[54] The "True American" index of four items likewise is a reliable predictor of support for Trump. In other words, whites who feel American nativity, speaking English, having "American" ancestry, and following America's customs are essential to American identity are more likely to rate Trump higher than those who refuse to believe that these traits are essential to American nationhood. Finally, those who felt we need to honor our forefathers and rid the country of any so-called "bad apples" are unreserved in their support for Trump.

Using the same dataset and same set of controls, we next turn to Figure 8.2, where we examine predictors of Trump support among POC. Here, we focus on perceived or experienced racism and discrimination, and the exclusion (or outsider status) that many minorities may have felt in 2016. Our variables that measure perceived discrimination against Blacks and Latinos are both associated with lower levels of Trump support, indicating that increasing levels of perceived discrimination diminishes regard for Trump. Moreover, consistent with our theory, racial

[54] See Parker and Barreto, *Change They Can't Believe In*, for more on the relationship between Tea Party support and reactionary politics.



FIGURE 8.1 Estimated change in Trump thermometer rating among whites, moving each variable from minimum to maximum value

minorities who believe they do not need to adapt their culture to fit in in America are more likely to reject Trump. We think this captures the sense of threat that many POC associated with Trump and his movement, both materially and symbolically. What's more, these results jive with more anecdotal evidence. For instance, Trump campaign rallies were often met with counterprotests by pro-immigrant groups, Black Lives Matter groups, as well as people standing up for American Muslims, women, and other groups who felt threatened by the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement. Many who protested against Trump attempted to use his language against him by declaring "Immigrants Make America Great" and "Love Trumps Hate" and "No to Racism, No to Trump." These sentiments are supported by our data, showing that POC concerned over cultural threats to make them "adapt" were significantly more likely to oppose Trump, even after we account for factors like racial resentment, ethnocentrism, social dominance, and ideology. One thing we'd like to



FIGURE 8.2 Estimated point change in oppose Trump (FT) among POC, moving each variable from minimum to maximum value

mention is the role of religion. For whites, it has absolutely no direct effect on support for Trump. The effect is likely mediated by ideology and moral traditionalism.

In Figure 8.3, we continue to examine predictors of Trump opposition among POC, this time with the CMPS dataset, which allows us to explore each minority group to see whether it was just Latinos or Blacks driving the anti-Trump effects. Further, the ANES only has roughly 2,000 total minority respondents, but the CMPS has 3,000 Latinos, Blacks, and Asian-Americans respndents each, which permits us to examine predictors of anti-Trump sentiment among all three groups. Similar to the ANES models, our key independent variables are measures of perceived and experienced racism and the suspicion that the larger society is not inclusive of minorities. As with the ANES models, we find evidence that material and symbolic threat informed all three minority groups' rejection of Trump in 2016.

Minorities who think racism one of the most pressing issues in America are more likely to oppose Trump than those who don't hold this



FIGURE 8.3. Estimated point change in strongly oppose Trump among POC, moving each variable from minimum to maximum value

sentiment. Likewise, those who report personally facing discrimination are more likely to oppose Trump. Our final measure, those who believe society as a whole fails to respect or value POC are associated with higher levels of opposition to Trump. On their own, such results are hardly surprising. However, they manage to hold, even after adjusting for important explanatory factors such as party identification, ideology, racial attitudes, and attitudes toward immigrants, as well as socioeconomic status and religiosity.

In Figures 8.4 and 8.5, we disaggregated our models by racial group; for, as we have already suggested, it may well be the case that one group accounts for the lion's share of the variation associated with the rejection of Trump. It just so happens that this isn't the case. Consider Figure 8.4. We find robust support for our hypotheses, across both symbolic (respect) and material domains (racism and discrimination), respectively, for each racial group. Next, in Figure 8.5, we combine the items proxying for symbolic threat (the symbolic item doesn't scale well with the material



FIGURE 8.4 Estimated probability of strongly opposing Trump by race



FIGURE 8.5 Combined impact of perceived racism on anti-Trump attitudes among POC

items) for each racial group, estimating their impact on opposition to Trump. While the Black community registered the highest total opposition to Trump once we assess the highest level of anti-Trump sentiment, the substantive effects are roughly comparable across all three groups.

Still, the slopes associated with Latinos and Asians are steeper. Of course, this means that material threat is a more meaningful predictor for these groups than it is among Blacks.

Our examination of support for (and opposition to) Trump confirms our priors. Further, it is important to point out that our three variables that tap into class and economic concerns are not associated with support for Trump. For whites, income has no direct bearing on Trump support. Likewise, and most critical, worry about one's financial situation isn't related to support for Trump among whites. This contradicts early widespread (and unfounded) support for the economic anxiety thesis. Yet, among whites, symbolic threat shapes support for Trump. For POC, both symbolic and material threat informs opposition to Trump, something we witnessed in the aggregate (i.e., all racial minorities group together) as well as separately.

Threat and Political Participation

Our theory proposes that the threat Trump represents also had the capacity to mobilize drawing both his white supporters and POC opponents into political engagement in 2016. Using both the CMPS and the ANES, we assess political participation across a range of dimensions in 2016, from voting and discussing politics online, to volunteering for a campaign and engaging in protest. We examine ten types of non-voting participation in the ANES (Figure 8.6), and thirteen types of participation in the CMPS in addition to validated voting (Figure 8.7).[55] Like the models exploring support and opposition to Trump, we also account for the most important factors that may be associated with political participation. Thus, we are looking for a "Trump bump,"[56] an effect above and beyond standard correlates of political participation.

Using the ANES data, in Figure 8.6, we aggregate across ten political acts, and examine how the "Trump bump" shapes political engagement, across groups, by race: whites and POC. The results conform to our hypotheses. For instance, the probability of becoming politically active – participating in three or more political acts – was highest among whites

[55] We exclude voting in the ANES because it was self-reported and validated turnout was not yet available. The CMPS includes validated turnout verified on the voter file.

[56] "Trump bump" as described by Dr. Gabriel Sanchez in an interview with the *Los Angeles Times,* November 3, 2016. www.latimes.com/nation/politics/trailguide/la-na-trailguide-updates-as-many-as-15-million-latinos-may-vote-1478202388-htmlstory.html.



FIGURE 8.6 Predicted probability of political participation 2016 by race

who supported Trump, and for Minorities it was the opposite: those who rated Trump a "0" on the feeling thermometer were the most engaged among POC.

Now, one might credibly claim that the results in Figure 8.6 are driven by a handful of items, likely led by voting. From discussing politics and attending meetings, to voting and boycotting, the CMPS data in Figure 8.7, affirms our findings in Figure 8.6. Confirming our hypotheses, symbolic threat (for whites) and symbolic *and* material threat (for POC) – both of which are represented by Trump-related sentiment – are associated with multiple modes of political engagement. The main differences between whites and POC appear to be the type of participation encouraged by threat. While symbolic threat among whites spurs more conventional political participation, for POC, the opposite result obtains: the most insistent opponents of Trump were more likely to be pursue political objectives through less conventional participation. Both groups, nonetheless, were active across many domains: whites were active across ten modes of participation, where POC were involved in eight.

Clearly, the patterns are consistent with our argument. For whites it was the (symbolic) threat of a changing America that Trump embodied, and his most loyal supporters were, indeed, politically active in 2016. For minorities, Trump himself (and the MAGA movement) were the (symbolic and material) threat, and Blacks, Latinos, and Asians who rated Trump most negatively, were also the most politically active in 2016. These results



FIGURE 8.7 Threat and political engagement by race

are of a piece with an emerging literature indicating the ways in which threat drives behavior, both on the Right and on the Left.[57]

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we elaborated an account of the 2016 election, one at odds with existing formulations, the most popular of which is associated with the import of economic anxiety. We argued that the threat over changing demographics, and the perceived loss of status among most whites, would better explain the outcome; it did. In fact, economic anxiety is a complete bust when it comes to explaining support for Trump. At the same time, Trump and his followers represented a threat, both material and symbolic, to POC. POC were concerned that Trump would unleash levels of racial hostility unseen since Jim Crow. (As it turns out, they were right.) Thus, our first two hypotheses are confirmed. We can say the same for our second two hypotheses, on the relationship between threat and mobilization. For whites attracted to the Trump campaign, they participated and engaged politics at higher rates, similar to prior studies documenting elevated participation among Tea Partiers. For minorities, the opposite held. Those most opposed to Trump, who perceived him as a threat, were the most likely to become politically engaged in 2016.

These patterns continue to this day, well after the events of 2016. Since then, POC have proven crucial to coalitions who sought to beat Trump-backed Republicans at the polls. From the special election in Alabama where Democrats won a senate seat over a Trump-backed Republican, to Virginia where another Democrat bested another Trump-affiliated candidate, Black voters have proven key.[58] More recently, Joe Biden owes much to the Black community for winning the White House, one likely attributed to the threat posed by Trump.[59] This is proof positive of the extent to which POC contribute to the resilience of American democracy.

[57] On threat and mobilization on the Right, see Blum, *How the Tea Party Captured the GOP*; Gervais and Morris, *Reactionary Republicanism*; Parker and Barreto, *Change They Can't Believe In*; on the Left, see Angela Gutierrez, Angela X. Ocampo, Matt A. Barreto, and Gary Segura, "Somos Más: How Racial Threat and Anger Mobilize Latino Voters in the Trump Era," *Political Research Quarterly* 72, no. 4 (2012): 960–975; Christopher Zepeda-Millán, *Latino Mass Mobilization: Immigration, Racialization, and Activism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

[58] https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/403977-theres-a-boost-in-black-turnout-especially-among-black-women-voters.

[59] Christopher C. Towler and Christopher S. Parker, "Between Anger and Engagement: Donald Trump and Black America," *Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics* 3, no.1

Apparently, Democrats realize the signifiance of the POC vote, since more racially equitable outcomes take place when Democrats are in charge.[60] Given the import of the Black and Latino vote in the 2020 election cycle, delivering the White House and the Senate, it's apparent that the patterns observed in the present chapter persisted. The only question is whether or not threat is a necessary condition to maintain high levels of turnout among POC, and the maintenance of American democracy. If this is true, we find it deeply ironic that fate of multi-racial American democracy may ultimately rest on threat. A delicate, if dangerous, balance to maintain.

Regression Tables

TABLE 8.1 *Predictors of support for Donald Trump by race in ANES 2016*

	Whites - Trump FT (0-100)		**POC - Trump FT (0-100)**	
	Coef.	**Std.Err**	**Coef.**	**Std.Err**
Tea Party FT	0.187***	0.025		
True American Index	0.705**	0.226		
Honor our forefathers	2.188***	0.498		
Blacks face discrimination			−2.754***	0.830
Latinos face discrimination			−1.621*	0.820
Minorities do not need to adapt			−1.283*	0.640
Ideology (7pt)	2.053***	0.547	0.623	0.666
Party ID (7pt)	5.647***	0.350	6.780***	0.451
Worried about economy	0.658	0.444	0.702	0.581

(continued)

(2018): 219–253; www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/03/07/why-bernie-sanders-economic-message-isnt-enough-to-win-over-black-voters-118197.

[60] On racially equitable outcomes, see Zoltan Hajnal, *Dangerously Divided: How Race and Class Shape Winning and Losing in American Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019); for more on turnout, race, and support for the Democratic Party, see Bernard L. Fraga, *The Turnout Gap: Race, Ethnicity and Political Inequality in a Diversifying America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

TABLE 8.1 *(continued)*

	Whites - Trump FT (0-100)		POC - Trump FT (0-100)	
	Coef.	**Std.Err**	**Coef.**	**Std.Err**
Desire smaller Fed Govt	−2.048+	1.170	−0.020	1.594
Attention to politics	2.730***	0.504	2.266***	0.650
Moral trad.	0.353+	0.189	1.113***	0.283
Racial Resentment Scale	0.751***	0.169	0.157	0.225
Authoritarianism Scale	0.257	0.251	0.065	0.332
SDO	0.285	0.187	0.168	0.271
Sexism Scale	0.803***	0.167	0.358+	0.209
Ethnocentrism	12.873***	2.973	6.557	4.066
Age	−0.040	0.034	−0.115*	0.050
Married	2.614*	1.160	−0.455	1.645
Female	−2.274*	1.054	−0.447	1.489
Education	−0.798**	0.256	0.643+	0.330
Home owner	0.537	1.287	2.154	1.693
Income	−0.111	0.077	−0.116	0.105
Born-again Christian	−0.049	1.278	0.921	1.698
Church attendance	−0.095	0.387	0.194	0.533
Survey mode: web	−0.024	1.167	−6.574***	1.656
Constant	−26.150***	4.417	−6.325	7.385
Adjusted-R2	0.570		0.426	
BIC	20680.005		8791.281	
Log-likelihood	−1.02e+04		−4313.212	
LR-Chi2				
Prob>chi	0.000		0.000	
N	2,246		962	

+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

TABLE 8.2 *Among POC: Predictors of support for Donald Trump (2016 CMPS)*

	All POC		Latinos		Blacks		AAPI	
	Coef.	Std.Err	Coef.	Std.Err	Coef.	Std.Err	Coef.	Std.Err
Racism major problem in US	−0.604***	0.072	−0.665***	0.144	−0.616***	0.107	−0.400**	0.135
Experienced discrimination	−0.540***	0.051	−0.592***	0.091	−0.407***	0.091	−0.528***	0.087
Society not respect POC	−0.228***	0.033	−0.202***	0.056	−0.196***	0.057	−0.275***	0.058
Ideology (lib–>con)	0.404***	0.026	0.502***	0.046	0.280***	0.045	0.431***	0.047
Democrat	−1.176***	0.051	−1.224***	0.093	−1.052***	0.094	−1.092***	0.087
Economy getting worse	−0.227***	0.020	−0.200***	0.036	−0.240***	0.036	−0.242***	0.035
Oppose Fed spending	0.016+	0.010	0.022	0.017	0.020	0.019	0.012	0.015
Interest in politics	0.139***	0.028	0.201***	0.049	0.079	0.051	0.189***	0.049
Deport all undocumented	0.533***	0.033	0.626***	0.062	0.310***	0.063	0.554***	0.052
Racial attitudes	−0.347***	0.030	−0.486***	0.052	−0.187**	0.059	−0.306***	0.050
Actual age 18–98	−0.003+	0.002	−0.002	0.003	−0.004	0.003	−0.002	0.003
Married	0.338***	0.053	0.074	0.094	0.355***	0.103	0.449***	0.088
Male	0.241***	0.050	0.082	0.091	0.493***	0.093	0.142+	0.081
Education level	−0.073**	0.023	−0.114**	0.042	−0.109*	0.047	−0.111**	0.039

(continued)

TABLE 8.2 *(continued)*

	All POC		Latinos		Blacks		AAPI	
	Coef.	Std.Err	Coef.	Std.Err	Coef.	Std.Err	Coef.	Std.Err
Home owner	0.061	0.057	0.146	0.102	0.019	0.110	0.008	0.093
Income level	−0.037***	0.009	−0.026	0.016	−0.060**	0.018	−0.052***	0.014
Evangelical	0.208***	0.062	0.453***	0.111	0.203+	0.105	0.099	0.113
Church attendance	0.046**	0.015	0.002	0.026	0.041	0.027	0.105***	0.024
cut1	0.318	0.241	0.674	0.425	0.037	0.460	0.146	0.410
cut2	1.381***	0.242	1.622***	0.426	1.118*	0.461	1.340**	0.410
cut3	3.045***	0.245	3.216***	0.433	2.442***	0.467	3.342***	0.417
Pseudo–R2	0.157		0.182		0.100		0.163	
BIC	15809.522		5221.496		4751.684		5947.243	
Log–likelihood	−7809.397		−2526.990		−2291.859		−2889.878	
LR-Chi2	2918.223		1124.493		509.195		1127.326	
Prob>chi	0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000	
N	8,798		2,913		2,976		2,909	

+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

[195–225]

TABLE 8.3 *Predictors of political participation (0–10) in 2016 by race in ANES*

	Whites - Pol Participation		POC - Pol Participation	
	Coef.	**Std.Err**	**Coef.**	**Std.Err**
Trump FT	0.005***	0.001	−0.005*	0.002
Ideology (7pt)	−0.250***	0.038	−0.162**	0.049
Party ID (7pt)	−0.023	0.027	0.020	0.038
Attention to politics	0.609***	0.038	0.436***	0.052
Age	−0.010***	0.002	−0.006	0.004
Married	−0.018	0.086	−0.184	0.127
Female	0.049	0.075	0.251*	0.114
Education	0.094***	0.018	0.117***	0.025
Home owner	−0.023	0.095	−0.057	0.131
Income	0.016**	0.006	0.010	0.008
Born-again Christian	−0.019	0.091	−0.161	0.129
Church attendance	0.027	0.027	0.132**	0.041
Survey mode: web	0.170*	0.082	0.450***	0.123
cut1	0.270	0.253	0.864*	0.355
cut2	1.507***	0.255	2.161***	0.361
cut3	2.436***	0.257	2.885***	0.366
cut4	3.317***	0.261	3.721***	0.373
cut5	4.093***	0.266	4.437***	0.380
cut6	4.871***	0.275	5.071***	0.390
cut7	5.586***	0.290	5.770***	0.411
cut8	6.595***	0.337	6.580***	0.458
cut9	7.297***	0.401	7.490***	0.564
cut10	9.117***	0.803	7.803***	0.621
Pseudo-R2	0.053		0.045	
BIC	8581.274		843.665	
Log-likelihood	−4200.546		−1842.732	
LR-Chi2	465.621		175.281	
Prob>chi	0.000		0.000	
N	2,525		971	

+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

TABLE 8.4 *Predictors of total participation count (0–13) among whites in CMPS*

	Coef.	SE	p-value
Highly favorable to Trump	1.247***	(0.277)	0.000
Economy getting worse	−0.096	(0.078)	0.219
Democrat	0.223	(0.296)	0.451
Independent	−0.511*	(0.249)	0.040
Ideology (lib->con)	−0.626***	(0.108)	0.000
Political efficacy	−0.119	(0.091)	0.193
Oppose Fed spending	0.041	(0.042)	0.325
Anti-immigrant resentment	−0.144*	(0.059)	0.015
Apologize for slavery	0.136	(0.121)	0.264
Racial linked fate	0.268	(0.163)	0.102
Evangelical	0.663**	(0.247)	0.007
American identity important	−0.180	(0.136)	0.185
Education level	0.762***	(0.091)	0.000
Income level	0.103**	(0.031)	0.001
Actual age 18–98	0.013*	(0.006)	0.025
Male	0.285	(0.197)	0.147
Constant	1.475	(1.241)	0.235
Adjusted-R2	0.231		
BIC	5222.724		
Log-likelihood	−2552.370		
F	20.330		
Prob>F	0.000		
N	1,033		

* p < 00.05, ** p < 00.01, *** p < 00.001

TABLE 8.5 *Predictors of total participation count (0 – 13) among POC in CMPS*

	Coef.	SE	p-value
Highly unfavorable to Trump	0.269***	(0.063)	0.000
Economy getting worse	−0.144***	(0.024)	0.000
Democrat	−0.161	0.097)	0.099
Independent	−0.593***	(0.097)	0.000
Ideology (lib->con)	−0.413***	(0.030)	0.000
Political efficacy	−0.174***	(0.028)	0.000
Oppose Fed spending	−0.014	(0.011)	0.217
Deport all undocumented	0.002	(0.043)	0.968
Apologize for slavery	0.180***	(0.037)	0.000
Racial linked fate	0.296***	(0.045)	0.000
Evangelical	0.508***	(0.067)	0.000
American identity important	0.324***	(0.036)	0.000
Education level	0.233***	(0.024)	0.000
Income level	0.058***	(0.010)	0.000
Actual age 18–98	−0.004*	(0.002)	0.018
Male	0.396***	(0.057)	0.000
Constant	1.694***	(0.305)	0.000
Adjusted-R2	0.112		
BIC	42353.647		
Log-likelihood	−2.11e+04		
F	71.139		
Prob>F	0.000		
N	8,883		

* p < 00.05, ** p < 00.01, *** p < 00.001