Racism systematically distorts policymakers’ analyses of their allies’ and adversaries’ capabilities, interests, and resolve, potentially leading to costly choices regarding war and peace. When policymakers hold racist beliefs, as they did in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), their beliefs influence how they explain and predict their allies’ and adversaries’ behaviors. Reliance on racist stereotypes leads policymakers to inaccurate assessments. An analysis of the relationship between stereotypes, reputations, and bigotry indicates that reputations easily become stereotypes—which is discomforting to anyone who bases policy decisions on another's reputation or encourages policymakers to do so. International security scholars have largely overlooked the role of racism, assuming rational choices on the part of policymakers. Research demonstrates that this assumption is wrong.
Racists believe that they have unlocked a secret to human behavior. Knowing another's race provides insight into why someone behaves as they do, and how they are likely to behave in the future. If racial types and their imagined characteristics were real, racial stereotypes would be invaluable to policymakers.1 Although racism seems tailor-made for influencing how policymakers assess one another's capabilities, interests, and resolve, international security experts have neglected its potential effect.2 This incuriosity extends more generally to racism in international politics.3 Presumably this uninterest stems from a belief that racism will not influence rational policymakers. This conclusion precedes evidence, and I argue that it is wrong. This article demonstrates that when policymakers hold racist beliefs, this racism systematically influences how they explain and predict their allies’ and adversaries’ behavior.
The content of racist beliefs is so varied that creating a general argument about its influence is challenging. Instead, my theoretical discussion focuses on two characteristics of racism to capture its influence on policymakers’ explanations and predictions. I then consider a competing explanation and detail why I selected the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) as my case study. I use this case study to examine how Russia assessed Japan, and how Germany and Great Britain assessed Japan and Russia. The conclusion expands the discussion to other types of intolerance and prejudice (or bigotry) and considers how easily reputations become stereotypes.