This review addresses three questions surrounding authoritarian legality and state capitalism in China. First, what is legality, and does it exist in China's Leninist single-party state? Scholars who characterize the system as order maintenance find the absence of legality. Those employing dual-state and instrumentalist views of law find partial legality. Scholars promoting the notion of bare legality find complete legality. Second, does authoritarian legality strengthen regime legitimacy? Scholars agree that the state seeks legitimation through its embrace of authoritarian legality. Empirical research tests this claim. Third, is China in transition from plan to market, and what is the role of law in state capitalism? The teleology of the transition paradigm overlooks illiberal underpinnings of property rights and factor markets. Answers to these questions help explain regime resilience, economic growth, economic crisis, and inequality in China. Both the institution of the dual state and the perpetuation of plan elements reinforce state power.